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‘‘Embodied’’ proposals claim that the meaning of at least some words, concepts and constructions is
grounded in knowledge about actions and objects. An alternative ‘‘disembodied’’ position locates seman-
tics in a symbolic system functionally detached from sensorimotor modules. This latter view is not ten-
able theoretically and has been empirically falsiﬁed by neuroscience research. A minimally-embodied
approach now claims that action–perception systems may ‘‘color’’, but not represent, meaning; however,
such minimal embodiment (misembodiment?) still fails to explain why action and perception systems
exert causal effects on the processing of symbols from speciﬁc semantic classes. Action perception theory
(APT) offers neurobiological mechanisms for ‘‘embodied’’ referential, affective and action semantics along
with ‘‘disembodied’’ mechanisms of semantic abstraction, generalization and symbol combination, which
draw upon multimodal brain systems. In this sense, APT suggests integrative-neuromechanistic explana-
tions of why both sensorimotor and multimodal areas of the human brain differentially contribute to spe-
ciﬁc facets of meaning and concepts.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 1. Introduction
Semantic and conceptual information is, at least in part, based
on information in action and perception systems of the brain and
mind. This position has sometimes been called semantic ‘‘ground-
ing’’. All well-developed ‘‘embodied’’ theories adopt such semantic
grounding in action and perception information, but also discuss
mechanisms not speciﬁc to individual modalities which make
additional contributions to semantic and conceptual processing
(for example, Arbib, 2008; Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Fischer & Zwaan,
2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Gallese, 2012; Kiefer &
Pulvermüller, 2012; Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco,
2012; Pulvermüller, 1999; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010). In Barsa-
lou’s proposal, perceptual information processed in sensory sys-
tems along with resultant activation in multimodal systems
jointly contribute to bottom-up concept processing (Barsalou, Kyle
Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003). In my own proposals, neuronal
circuits (cell assemblies) distributed over sensory, motor and mul-timodal association areas are the neurobiological correlates of
meaningful words and constructions (Pulvermüller, 1999). A key
concept is that of semantic circuits: cell assemblies that bind
modality speciﬁc semantic information into a more abstract multi-
modal, and therefore in a sense ‘‘amodal’’1 and ‘‘modality-unspe-
ciﬁc’’, representation (Fuster, 1995; Pulvermüller, 2012). These
semantic circuits are widely distributed and can reach into modal-
ity-speciﬁc and multimodal areas of cortex. Crucially, semantic cir-
cuit topographies (their distributions over the cortex) can reﬂect
aspects of the category-speciﬁc meanings they carry. As I explain
in Section 3 below, this theoretical perspective covers all aspects
of cognition sometimes claimed to be missing from some versions
of embodiment theory, including mechanisms for abstraction, gener-
alization and symbol combination.
A so-called ‘‘disembodied’’ perspective has been proposed
according to which semantic representations and processes are lo-
cated exclusively in amodal mind and brain systems. In this mod-
ular perspective, sensory and motor processes are viewed as being
entirely ‘‘ancillary’’ to meaning and concepts. However, on the ba-
sis of theoretical arguments and recent evidence – for example the
semantically speciﬁc inﬂuence of motor action on abstract sen-
tence semantics (Glenberg, Sato, & Cattaneo, 2008) or the causal ef-
fect of magnetic stimulation of arm/leg motor areas on theimilar to
asic).
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speak about arm or leg actions (Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, &
Ilmoniemi, 2005) – it is now generally acknowledged that action
and perception systems, possibly interacting with additional mul-
timodal (or ‘‘amodal’’) systems, can make semantically-speciﬁc
contributions – at least to the processing of some semantic aspects
of at least some words and constructions.2
However, this new evidence does not force one to adopt
standard embodiment accounts. Coming from a modularist
tradition, one may prefer a strategy to design a theory that builds
on an amodal semantic system and just gives way to alternative
proposals as much as it must under the pressure of the data. A
disembodied approach with just a grain of embodiment has been
proposed by Caramazza and his colleagues (for example, Bedny &
Caramazza, 2011; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). This present paper
will discuss disembodiment along with such minimal-compromise
positions (part 2), highlight their difﬁculties, and review an
alternative, a view on abstract semantic mechanisms grounded in
concrete neuronal brain circuitry (part 3). Relevant evidence
is discussed throughout and is the focus of the ﬁnal section
(part 4).2. Embodiment vs. disembodiment: multiple confusions
Theories are sometimes called embodied, because they ground
cognitive processes in bodily action and perception (Barsalou,
2008; de Vega, Graesser, & Glenberg, 2008; Fischer & Zwaan,
2008; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Meteyard et al., 2012). Note
again that this position implies that action and perception mecha-
nisms play a role in the semantics of at least some words, symbols
and constructions, but it does not preclude other (nonmotor and
nonsensory) mechanisms to contribute to semantics. Models
including a semantic module encapsulated from action and per-
ception systems are key examples of disembodiment. In modular
models, conceptual/semantic, action and perception systems are
each thought to be informationally encapsulated from each other,
therefore excluding a direct contribution of action and perception
information to meaning representation (Fodor, 1983). Conse-
quently, action and perception mechanisms are not considered
semantic (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008).
The above explanations of the terms ‘‘embodiment’’ and ‘‘dis-
embodiment’’ may be shared by some, perhaps most, in the ﬁeld,
but they are not agreed upon generally. As a consequence, it is
sometimes not clear what the dispute about embodiment is actu-
ally all about. Upon recent reviews highlighting the embodiment
debate, the present section will speciﬁcally discuss misrepresenta-
tions of embodiment ideas (‘‘misembodiment’’) and recent propos-
als of ‘‘minimal embodiment’’.2.1. Confusions about embodiment: misembodiment
Caramazza and his group did not frame the contrast between
embodiment and disembodiment as explained above. In their view,
embodiment means ‘‘that conceptual content is reductively con-
strued by information that is represented within the sensory and
motor systems’’ (p. 59, Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) and ‘‘that con-
cepts are no more than a recapitulation of sensorimotor experi-
ences’’ (Caramazza, NLC2011 abstract). This vision of
‘‘embodiment’’ is not appropriate if it is meant as a description of2 Please note that there are signs that do not directly relate to objects and actions –
most notably grammatical function words along with grammatical afﬁxes (Pulver-
müller, 1999) – and that even for very clearly object- or action-related expressions
there are semantic aspects not captured by object or action links (Frege, 1980;
Pulvermüller, 2012).current approaches.Not a single one of themajor approaches to con-
ceptual and semantic mechanisms shares these assumptions. As
embodiment positions are fundamentally misrepresented by
Caramazza and his colleagues, I will speak aboutmisembodiment in
this context.3
Caramazza et al.’s misrepresentation of embodiment theories
leads these authors to state that, according to one of the key papers
in the ﬁeld of embodied cognition (Barsalou, 1999), concepts are
‘‘no longer embodied’’ (p. 68, Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). This is
because, in Barsalou’s model, convergence zones in ‘‘higher’’ asso-
ciation cortex receive a role in multimodal integration of informa-
tion and concept processing, a key feature of this and most other
models currently treated under the ‘‘embodiment’’ label. In my
own work, I drew attention to the fact that the functional proper-
ties of neuron circuits enable them to approximate logical opera-
tions, including AND and OR,4 a well-known fact which has been
emphasized early for abstract neuron models (see Kleene, 1956;
McCulloch & Pitts, 1943) and more recently for interlinked neuronal
assemblies (e.g., Buzsáki, 2010; Hayon, Abeles, & Lehmann, 2005;
Palm, 1982; Pulvermüller, 2002b; Wennekers, Garagnani, & Pulver-
müller, 2006; Wennekers & Palm, 2009). Therefore, neuronal ma-
chines can easily accommodate abstract symbolic processes. If
there are neuronal assemblies with strong links into cortical areas
important for action and perception, which can therefore be called
‘‘embodied’’, these same circuits can certainly, at the same time,
serve their normal function as ‘‘symbolic’’ processors. Such circuits
would obviously do more than ‘‘recapitulating sensory experiences’’
although they would still be, in a sense, ‘‘embodied’’. In my view,
many distributed neuronal sets carrying semantic function are both
‘‘embodied’’ and symbolic.2.2. Confusions about the role of action perception circuits
Similar to disembodiment, Mahon and Caramazza propose ‘‘an
‘abstract’ and ‘symbolic’ level of conceptual content (. . .) not consti-
tuted by sensory and motor information’’. In Caramazza et al.’s
hands, sensorimotor systems are allowed to functionally contribute
to conceptual or semantic processing, although this contribution is
described, rather metaphorically, as ‘‘coloring’’ or ‘‘dressing’’ the
concept (p. 68f, Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). However, there is some
lackof clarity as towhat the terms ‘‘coloring’’ and ‘‘dressing’’mean in
this context. In linewith the observation that colors and dresses can
be put on an object but are not part of the object, Bedny and Caram-
azza further stress the idea of abstract concepts in ‘‘modality-inde-
pendent’’ areas, now arguing against a role of sensorimotor
systems in conceptual processing (Bedny & Caramazza, 2011). It
therefore appears that, in this perspective, action and perception
systemsare seenas capableof changing the appearance (color, dress)
of concepts, but not of changing their essence, which is contained in
the ‘‘amodal’’ symbolic system.
As sensory and motor information is not viewed as ‘‘constitu-
tive’’ or fundamental, removal of these systems should be possible
without affecting conceptual or semantic content. However, the
authors’ statements in this context are vague. They write that
‘‘‘removing’ the sensory and motor systems (as in brain damage)
would result in impoverished or ‘isolated’ concepts’’ and in this
sense the ‘‘activation of sensory and motor processes during con-
ceptual processing is not necessarily ‘ancillary to’ or ‘inconsequen-
tial for’ conceptual processing’’ (p. 68, Mahon & Caramazza, 2008).
Note that these statements suggest a deﬁcit, but are compatible3 To preclude any confusion: By ‘‘misembodiment’’, I mean misconceptions about
embodiment and grounded cognition.
4 As neurons are probabilistic devices, it is best to think of their symbolic capacities
in terms of probabilistic logic.
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‘‘dressing’’ are fully intact and functional. Still, a further statement
is that ‘‘sensory and motor information, on that view, contributes
to the ‘full’ representation of a concept’’, now implying that, if sen-
sory and motor systems are missing and cannot contribute, the
concept will not be ‘‘full’’ any longer, thus being impaired. But
would the presumed impairment of the concept be signiﬁcant or
rather superﬁcial? These statements are open to a wide range of
possible interpretations and especially to the position that, what-
ever might go on in action and perception systems of the mind
and brain, their lesion could at best remove some minor amount
of superﬁcial conceptual information. In sum, sensory and motor
systems may contribute to, in a ‘‘dressing’’ sense, but are not con-
stitutive and necessary for, concepts and meanings (Mahon &
Caramazza, 2008). They would function as optional enrichment
and coloring while not being essential.5
Why is there an inﬂuence of speciﬁc hand/arm movements on
the processing of speciﬁc types of abstract sentences (Glenberg
et al., 2008)? Why should magnetic pulses to the foot region inﬂu-
ence the processing of leg-related action words such as ‘‘walk’’ or
‘‘run’’ (Pulvermüller, Hauk et al., 2005)? Why would the leg motor
system light up already 100–200 ms after speech input ﬁrst pro-
vides the information about an upcoming leg-related action word
(Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi, 2005)? And should the motor
system instantaneously kick in in abstract meaning understanding,
for example when subjects hear about somebody ‘‘kicking the
bucket’’ (see Boulenger et al., 2012) – or should it not? Such predic-
tions and explanations were provided by speciﬁc grounded-neuro-
cognitive models (see Sections 3 and 4), and the sometimes
unexpected results have made life difﬁcult for classic modular
and ‘‘disembodied’’ theories. In the context of Caramazza et al.’s
minimally-embodied approach, it remains to be clariﬁed which
data sets are predicted and explained, and how the explanations
actually work. At present, the ‘‘dressing’’ or ‘‘coloring’’ function of
action and perception systems seems to contrast with data on cau-
sal effects on and impairments of semantic-category-speciﬁc pro-
cesses brought about by stimulation and lesion of sensorimotor
cortex (Sections 4.3–4.4).2.3. Confusion about functional interaction
For systems of encapsulated modules, there is no problem in
localizing cognitive functions (e.g. understanding) in one module
but not in others. Mahon and Caramazza illustrate this using Le-
velt’s modular model of speech production where information is
allowed to cascade from semantic down to phonological modules
– without any pathway for travelling back (Levelt, 1989; Levelt
et al., 1991; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). In this context, it makes5 On the empirical side, Mahon and Caramazza emphasize dissociations between
understanding and acting in neuropsychological patients, for example between the
abilities to imitate pantomimes and to produce and comprehend the corresponding
action verbs, as well as between the ability to use tools and the ability to comprehend
the corresponding tool nouns (see, for example, Papeo, Negri, Zadini, & Rumiati,
2010). But these and similar dissociations do not constitute any difﬁculty for an
account viewing articulatory, acoustic and semantic representations of a word as tied
together by distributed neuronal circuits (see Sections 3 and 4.4, and also Plaut &
Shallice, 1993; Pulvermüller & Preissl, 1991). Not only will lesions at different loci
within a distributed representation have dissociating effects, it should also be clear
that the different tasks involve additional cognitive and perceptual processes to
different degrees, which may lead to additional dissociation. For example, the visual-
perceptual abilities required for exact imitation of pantomime or for grasping an
object are quite different from those required for typical linguistic tasks. Note,
furthermore, that even within the domain of acting upon objects there are ﬁne-
grained dissociations that are best attributed to differential processing of perceptual
parameters relevant for action in dorsal and ventral visual streams (Goodale, Milner,
Jakobson, & Carey, 1991; Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 1995; Milner &
Goodale, 2008).sense to see semantics being processed in the semantic module
and any activation reaching the phonological module as overspill
from semantics, which is unable to contribute further to semantic
processing. However, as soon as reciprocal and dynamic interac-
tion is introduced, such functional separation becomes impossible;
phonological and semantic information interact dynamically
across phonological and semantic nodes (Dell, 1986; Dell, Sch-
wartz, Martin, Saffran, & Gagnon, 1997). Therefore, an interactive
framework allows semantic mechanisms to be effective in and to
be inﬂuenced by other processing components.
Importantly, Caramazza and his colleagues argue against modu-
larismanddisembodiment in itspurest form: ‘‘language, perception,
and action are not isolatedmodules but interact dynamically’’ (p. 92,
Bedny & Caramazza, 2011). This statement is great news and indi-
cates that the major argument bolstered by data from language–ac-
tion interactionshaveﬁnally contributed to amore general rejection
of modularist positions (see also Pulvermüller, 2005). The acknowl-
edged interactive nature of language, action andperceptionprocess-
ing implies that action, perception and linguistic – including
‘‘modality-independent’’ semantic – systems exchange information.
Given agreement on thismajor issue has nowbeen achieved, it is in-
deed important to explore the hypothesis space and ﬁnd consistent
models that explain relevant newdata sets. Unfortunately, however,
Caramazza andhis colleagues stillmaintain that ‘‘understanding the
word ‘‘run’’ occurs in modality-independent neural systems’’ (p. 92,
Bedny & Caramazza, 2011) – and thus outside of areas crucial for ac-
tion and perception, such as higher sensory and premotor cortex. Is
there a degree of incompatibility here?
One may want to understand these statements in the sense that
modality unspeciﬁc systems are seen as necessary and modality-
speciﬁc systems as optional. However, this does not seem to be
sensible; it would obviously be wrong to state that the thrust push-
ing an airplane occurs in one of its three engines because two of
them can optionally be switched off. There is reason to say that,
if all three are at work, the airplane’s thrust in fact occurs in all
three of them – even though one alone may do the job. The state-
ments about (i) the occurrence of understanding exclusively in the
modality independent system and (ii) this system’s dynamic inter-
action with action and perception mechanisms in meaning pro-
cessing must both be understood as statements about system
functionality. In this reading, there seems to be a conceptual issue,
as these statements are indeed incompatible with each other. If
‘‘modality-independent’’ semantic areas and action/perception
systems exchange the information they process, then the latter
must receive semantic information from the former, be allowed
to process, enrich and ground this information with/in information
about actions and perceptions and send the resultant enhanced
semantic information back. Crucially, as semantic information
would, in this view, be processed both in modality-independent
symbolic and in action–perception systems, it seems impossible
to justify why, in such an architecture, understanding should ‘‘oc-
cur’’ only in the modality-independent semantic system. The inter-
activity statement implies that action/perception systems can
provide a genuine locus of semantic processing – not necessarily
for all symbols, but at least for some. Likewise, it is difﬁcult to jus-
tify that semantic information would merely be ‘‘colored’’ or
‘‘dressed’’, rather than being fundamentally changed or transduced
by the action–perception system. Functional interaction entails
distributed cognitive processes and, in this speciﬁc case, semantics
in action and perception systems. At least for words typically used
to speak about objects and actions, it seems necessary to acknowl-
edge a genuine semantic role of sensorimotor information and ac-
tion and perception systems of the brain. This is precisely the sense
in which Barsalou, Glenberg and several others postulated a contri-
bution of sensorimotor brain and cognitive systems to semantics
and concepts (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Pulver-
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leagues seem to realize that interactivity is required, their modal-
ity-independence statement about understanding, which may be
inherited from the tradition of modularism, appears incompatible
with this insight. If they make the necessary inferential step from
interactivity to distributed semantics, their model will be in line
with current embodied or grounded perspectives (Barsalou, 2008;
Glenberg & Gallese, 2012; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Pulvermüller,
2012).
In essence, we are now very close to seeing language, percep-
tion, and action systems as nonmodular and dynamically-interac-
tive, which implies distributed semantics also involving action
and perception systems (for speciﬁc semantic types of words and
constructions).2.4. Why grounding is necessary for semantics and a symbolic
‘‘amodal’’ system is not sufﬁcient
According to disembodied theories of meaning, the mechanisms
of perception and comprehension of signs are distinct and func-
tionally separated from those of relating these signs to objects in
the world or to actions the subject could potentially engage in.
Similarly, minimally-embodied proposals such as those made by
Caramazza’s group place concepts and meaning in an amodal
(modality-unspeciﬁc) symbolic system, with optional ‘‘dressing’’
contributions of action and perception systems. These approaches
will now be considered in light of semantic theories.
Semantic theories view knowledge of the referent object(s) of a
word as an integral part of its meaning (Frege, 1980; Quine, 1960).
This is not to say that meaning can be reductively construed as ref-
erence; clearly, other well-known meaning facets need to be cov-
ered over and above reference (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet,
2000). In analytical philosophy, language is considered to receive
its meaning from the embedding of signs into typical contexts of ac-
tions and interactions between individuals who speak the language
(meaning as use, Baker & Hacker, 2009; Wittgenstein, 1953). In the
context of semantic theories of reference and use, a functional sep-
aration of referential semantics and action semantics from abstract
‘‘amodal’’ semantics seems inappropriate, because one is constitu-
tive for the other. Knowing the meaning of a word or construction
requires and includes the ability to identify entities which the
utterance is used to speak about. The intrinsic link between per-
ception, action and semantics/concepts is bolstered, for example,
by evidence from deprived populations. For example, color con-
cepts and resultant semantic categorization in congenitally blind
people differ from those in people to whom this referential visual
knowledge is available (see, for example, Connolly, Gleitman, &
Thompson-Schill, 2007).
Still, respectable psychological theories of meaning have framed
semantics in terms of relationships between signs, so that the
meaning of one sign is characterized by the other signs it co-occurs
with or relates to (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Landauer & Dumais,
1997). In such an approach, referential links or action connections
are not part of the semantic system per se. and it may seem to make
sense to functionally dissect semantics from action and perception
systems in a ‘‘disembodied’’ or modular fashion. However, it is nec-
essary to realize that such a symbolic semantic system misses an
important component of semantics, the crucial relationship of
signs to objects and actions (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Harnad,6 There is, by the way, no escape line from this argument using the processing/
representation distinction, proposing that the processing may be interactive but the
semantic representations still limited to the ‘‘modality-independent’’ semantic
system. This is because the performance of the semantic transduction processes
requires the availability of the transducer, whose mechanisms are of course open to a
description in terms of symbolic formulae.1990; Searle, 1980). In his ‘‘Chinese room’’ example, Searle had
shown that a person who has learned to manipulate and combine
the symbols of a foreign language with each other ﬂawlessly, yet
without knowing their object, action, or life relationships, cannot
be said to know or understand the meaning of that language, or
to use it meaningfully. This paradigm shows that semantics is more
than recombining symbols. One may argue that ‘‘there is nothing
more physiologically or logically real about perception than about
abstract cognition’’ (Landauer, 1999), but, within a functional
semantic system, ‘‘word–word’’ combinatorial knowledge needs
to be complemented by semantic information about ‘‘word–world’’
relationships (Cangelosi, Greco, & Harnad, 2002; Pulvermüller,
2002a). Any symbolic system requires reference and semantic
grounding of meaning in the world and in interaction. For a lan-
guage to convey meaning, it needs at least some words and con-
structions that can link up with objects, their sensorimotor
features and actions. A symbolic system in itself cannot achieve
this. We need to know what we speak about in order to speak
meaningfully.
An argument similar to that made above for single signs and
words can be made for whole sentences: Construing sentence
meaning as an abstract symbolic process likewise faces important
theoretical counter-arguments rooted in semantic theory. For a
large class of the uses of the word ‘‘meaning’’, the meaning of this
word can be explained as the truth conditions of an assertive sen-
tence or statement (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 2000; Davidson,
1967; Frege, 1980). Now, a disembodied account, and equally the
minimally-embodied ones discussed above, can explain the mean-
ing of sentence (S1) but not (S2).
(S1) A bear has fur.
(S2) This bear has fur.
Assessing the truth of sentence (S1), and therefore part of its
meaning (Frege, 1980), is possible by relating the semantic con-
cepts of BEAR and FUR to each other. As a bear is, by deﬁnition, a
mammal and mammals are (at least in the vast majority of cases)
hairy creatures, a general statement expressed by (S1) can be
judged as (almost) universally correct. Such judgment is possible
within an ‘‘amodal’’, even encapsulated (lexico-) semantic system
relating semantic concepts to each other. However, the phrase
‘‘this bear’’ in (S2) is typically used to refer to one speciﬁc bear,
and it could be one whose fur has just been shaved off. To judge
the truth conditions of the assertion that (S2) is correct, it is, in
many cases, not sufﬁcient to consider the semantic relationship be-
tween linguistic expressions. If (S2) is used to speak about a real
bear (e.g., while the speaker points to it when using the deictic par-
ticle ‘‘this’’), and one were to judge whether (S2) is correct, it would
be necessary for one’s linguistic system to make contact with per-
ceptual systems. If one were to believe in the existence of an amo-
dal semantic system, one had to acknowledge that processing and
judging the meaning of assertion (S2) requires processes in the ‘‘inter-
face system’’ connecting the hypothetical amodal semantic system
with the perceptual system. In the context of empirical statements
about the world, an amodal semantic system is insufﬁcient for pro-
cessing meaning. There can be semantics in the perceptual inter-
face. And, by extension, in the action interface too.
These statements can be reformulated as statements about the
neurobiological level: If we assume that there are two distinct neu-
ronal representations – one for the sentence and proposition ‘‘that
this bear has fur’’ and one for the perception of an entity that is in-
deed a hairy bear – the veriﬁcation of the statement requires the
activation of both representations, plus a priming-type relation-
ship between the two so that the semantic link is implemented.
This consideration provides one more argument that a semantic
theory conﬁned to an amodal system cannot be a full semantic the-
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One more inadequate assumption, which has been haunting the
discussions about embodiment, should be addressed: the idea that
concepts are always the same, or at least share a common kernel,
whenever they are applied. Mahon and Caramazza conclude that,
since dogs come with different perceptual features, the DOG-con-
cept, which, in their view, must be the same in different contexts
(and at different times, in different people) cannot have perceptual
features as constitutive parts (p. 68, Mahon & Caramazza, 2008).
Also in this context, a brief look at semantic theory is helpful: What
is the concept of a GAME? As games can be so extremely different
from each other (consider chess, football, solitaire, and Counter-
Strike), it is impossible to deﬁne the set of games by a set of shared
semantic features (Baker & Hacker, 2009; Wittgenstein, 1953). The
union of semantic features of all games would certainly result in a
set which is not sufﬁcient for uniquely deﬁning the concept. So, in-
deed, concepts and word meanings depend on context and the dif-
ferent context-dependent word meanings resemble each other like
the members of a family, with some members sharing features but
others being entirely different. This well-known fact led semanti-
cists to adopt the term ‘‘family resemblance’’ to describe the rela-
tionships between the different meaning-facets of words such as
‘‘game’’, ‘‘justice’’, ‘‘dog’’, or ‘‘bear’’ (see Barsalou, 1982; Kiefer &
Pulvermüller, 2012; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Wittgenstein, 1953).
Thus, context-independence of concepts cannot be used to justify
an amodal semantic system because such context-independence
is illusory. A more ﬂexible neurosemantic model is necessary (for
elaboration, see Pulvermüller, 2002b).
In sum, essential components of meaning, including processing
of reference and of truth of certain empirical statements, cannot be
realized without involvement of perception and action systems.
Information about action and perception provides important
criteria for the semantically appropriate application of concrete
words and constructions and for that of abstract utterances too.
The intuition that a word always means the same thing, and a
concept is always the same, regardless of its context, does not quite
stand up to scrutiny; the context-relationship of sensorimotor
semantic features is therefore not more surprising than that of
other semantic features. Therefore, semantic theory appears con-
sistent with a role of action and perception information in meaning
processing.
2.5. Learning abstract word meaning
Arguments for semantic grounding in action and perception are
usually made for concrete words and statements used to speak
about actions and objects. Therefore, it has been speculated that
a grounded or ‘‘embodied’’ approach might generally be insufﬁ-
cient for abstract concepts and that only an amodal symbolic sys-
tem can ‘‘account’’ for them (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008).
However, exactly the same points made in the context of reference
above apply to abstract concepts and meanings too.7 Wittgenstein
suggests that (the) meaning (of a word or construction) is what the
explanation of (this) meaning explains (§560, Wittgenstein, 1953).
So how would we explain the meaning of ‘‘justice’’, say to a child?
Typically by mentioning situations that can be taken as instantia-
tions of JUSTICE – children receiving each the same amount of
sweets, a thief having to pay for stolen goods, a killer being locked7 Some cognitive scientists do not distinguish between meanings and concepts,
treating these terms as more or less equivalent. In semantic theory, a distinction is
usually made between them: whereas concepts may exist independently of language,
meanings are concepts with an intrinsic link to individual signs, so that these
‘‘semantic concepts’’ are manifest in the use of the sign. Here I focus on meaning
assuming that any conclusions apply to other concepts too.away for life for his killings. The situation-embedding of abstract
conceptual knowledge can be traced experimentally (Barsalou &
Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). Although a collection of exemplars cannot,
of course, account for generalization of the concept, each and every
typical exemplar can provide a basis of generalization to similar
cases. Crucially, without concrete examples of situational instantia-
tions, or action–perception manifestations, it is hard to see how an ab-
stract meaning or concept could be introduced to a language learner
lacking similar concepts in the ﬁrst place. Dictionary deﬁnitions –
Webster’s explains JUSTICE as ‘‘The quality of being just or fair’’ –
and feature list models – which may ‘‘explain’’ the meaning of JUS-
TICE by a semantic feature [+ just] – use a partially circular strategy
in explaining novel abstract meaning, which does not appear to be
particularly helpful in the explanation process. Thus, there seems
to be no alternative to listing typical examples (that is, action–per-
ception manifestations) if one were to explain the meaning of ab-
stract words to a ﬁrst-language-learning child.8 Furthermore, as
abstract concepts such as JUSTICE are highly culture-speciﬁc and
subject to change over time, the possibility of inborn ideas does
not seem to provide a fruitful explanatory avenue in this and similar
contexts either.
Vigliocco and colleagues have pointed to a connection between
abstractness and emotional–affective meaning. Many (although
not all) abstract words are rated as highly emotional (or ‘‘arous-
ing’’) in meaning (Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, & Del Cam-
po, 2011). Therefore, explaining the semantics of abstract words
used to speak about internal states and emotions may be particu-
larly relevant for understanding abstract semantics generally. If
these words receive their meaning, in part, through grounding in
emotion, it still needs to be explained how this emotion grounding
can be established, which an amodal semantic system account
does not address. Assume the amodal semantic system contains
an inborn emotional concept of STINGINESS; how could a learner
know to relate it to the corresponding word, and not to ‘‘lavish-
ness’’? The classic answer in semantic theory is that this is possi-
ble, because the abstract emotion concepts have characteristic
ways in which they aremanifest in behavior, in the actions and inter-
actions the learner engages in with speakers of the language (Witt-
genstein, 1953). So the link between an abstract emotion word
and its abstract concept is by way of the manifestation of the latter
in prototypical actions. The child could be taught an abstract emo-
tion word such as ‘‘joy’’, because it shows JOY-expressing action
schemas, which language teaching adults use as criteria for correct
application of the emotion word ‘‘joy’’. Thus, the motor manifesta-
tion of the emotion becomes the crucial link between word use and
internal state and, hence, between sign and concept. This proposal
predicts that abstract emotion words do not only activate limbic
emotion-related circuits but, in addition, the motor system con-
trolling face and arm actions with which emotions are typically ex-
pressed. Such motor involvement in abstract emotion word
processing can be predicted for language learning children and, if
the ‘‘embodied’’ motor link persists throughout later life, in adults
as well. Motor system activation for emotion-expressing body
parts was indeed found when adults passively processed abstract
emotion words (Moseley, Carota, Hauk, Mohr, & Pulvermüller,
2012), suggesting that for one important class of abstract concepts
grounding in action is of the essence. For other abstract words and
constructions, neuroimaging results suggest different cortical cor-
relates in both modality-speciﬁc and multimodal areas (see, for
example, Binder, Westbury, McKiernan, Possing, & Medler, 2005;
Boulenger, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2009; Fiebach & Friederici, 2004).8 This does not explain how one unique abstract concept of JUSTICE could emerge
from the variable examples; but such an explanation is nonessential as the ‘‘unique
abstract concept’’ may not exist (see family resemblance argument above).
9 The distinction between structural system (region, area) and functional circuit
(cell assembly) is missing, for example, in Shallice’s paper from 1989, where he
suggests that ‘‘the semantic system is a large distributed network within which more
specialised subregions have developed; this might arise because it is a system which
receives many types of input at different entry points and serves a number of
different systems from different exit points’’ (p. 141, Shallice, 1989).
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There is an ongoing debate about the status of double dissocia-
tions in neuropsychological research which recently spilled over in
the embodiment debate. Mahon and Caramazza have argued that
‘‘if two representations (e.g., the concept HAMMER and the motor
information about how to use hammers) are represented over the
same sets of nodes in a network, then they cannot strongly disso-
ciate’’ (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). Contrasting with this view,
Shallice has argued that lesions affecting the incoming and outgo-
ing ends of one central distributed representation may primarily
cause dysfunction in one modality (Shallice, 1988); numerous net-
work simulation studies further demonstrate double dissociations
in systems with distributed representations (e.g., Garagnani,
Wennekers, & Pulvermüller, 2008; Plaut & Shallice, 1993; Pulver-
müller & Preissl, 1991). Note again the example of interacting ac-
tion and ‘‘modality-independent’’ systems: Even if the latter is
said to provide proper semantic feature integration while the for-
mer is just attributed a ‘‘dressing’’ role in such processing, a lesion
of either part of any truly distributed semantic system including
both multimodal and action parts will have its very speciﬁc and
dissociable effects on semantic processing.
If action and perception representations are bound together in
distributed action–perception circuits, or APCs (see Section 3 for
further explanation), the feedback and feedforward ﬂow of activa-
tion in these APCs will enhance processing and any signiﬁcant le-
sion on either the motor or the sensory side will have an impact
of processing efﬁcacy on the other. Still, a relatively more pro-
nounced motor deﬁcit will result from lesion on the motor side
of the APC, whereas a perceptual deﬁcit will dominate with lesion
at the sensory end (e.g., Pulvermüller & Preissl, 1991). The same
argument applies to other double dissociations too, e.g. between
phonological and semantic deﬁcits in aphasia or between object
use and recognition in apraxia and agnosia (Negri et al., 2007; Pa-
peo et al., 2010). Double dissociations are therefore consistent with
models building on intrinsic linkage of action and perception
mechanisms (see Section 3), and with grounded or embodied mod-
els building upon such action–perception links.
2.7. Multiple semantics: necessary for avoiding multiple confusions
Semantic models rooted in action and perception postulate
multiple modality-speciﬁc semantic systems in motor, somatosen-
sory, gustatory, olfactory, auditory and visual systems (e.g., Kiefer
& Pulvermüller, 2012; Pulvermüller, 1999; Shallice, 1988, 1989;
Warrington & Shallice, 1984). As there are words like ‘‘walk’’,
which are used to speak about one type of action, and words like
‘‘groundhog’’ referring to objects with speciﬁc visual features, it
has been suggested that the brain devices for such ‘‘action’’ and
‘‘visually-related’’ words are neuronal assemblies linking a word
form or symbolic network part in perisylvian frontal, parietal and
temporal cortex especially stronglywith action or object knowledge
stored in motor or visual systems, respectively (Section 3.2, see
Kiefer & Spitzer, 2001). However, concrete words (including ‘‘walk’’
and ‘‘groundhog’’) typically not only relate to knowledge from one
modality. A TROUT has a speciﬁc ﬁshy look, touch, taste and possi-
bly smell, and one may even know how to catch one. How would
these pieces of knowledge, supposedly stored in different sensory
and motor systems, be integrated with each other? A famous argu-
ment was that such integration of multimodal semantic informa-
tion requires one single amodal semantic system, where all
information comes together (Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007),
or, alternatively, reduplication of all semantic knowledge in each
of the modality-speciﬁc systems (Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp, & Roma-
ni, 1990). Caramazza et al. argued that, in this latter view, ‘‘it is not
possible to have a coherent theory of multiple semantics that dis-tinguishes between different semantic systems on the basis of for-
mat of representation and at the same time includes within any
format-speciﬁc system the disparate sorts of information’’ (Caram-
azza et al., 1990). Is this reservation motivated against modern
models of category-speciﬁc semantics and, by extension, against
semantic grounding and ‘‘embodiment’’?
The model of semantic circuits summarized below in Section 3
removes the problems seen by Caramazza et al. by distinguishing
between semantic systems on one side and semantic circuits on
the other.9 Modality-speciﬁc semantic systems are sets of brain
areas. In contrast, semantic information is integrated by individual
semantic representations neurobiologically realized as distributed
neuronal circuits binding speciﬁc information about action and per-
ception. Critically, these circuits are typically distributed over a
range of modality-speciﬁc and multimodal cortical areas. Therefore,
the circuits – and not the areas – provide the mechanism for seman-
tic/conceptual information integration across modalities (Pulver-
müller, 1999, 2012). The distribution of these circuits over speciﬁc
cortical areas – including motor, visual and other modality-speciﬁc
as well as multimodal cortices, with especially strong connections
among neurons processing semantic features of special relevance –
does not pose a ‘‘multiple-representation problem’’, as suggested
by Caramazza et al. (1990) in their discussion with Shallice (1988,
1989). At the cognitive, psychological and linguistic levels, the dis-
tributed circuit is best described as one single multimodal semantic
representation with speciﬁc distribution over a set of cortical areas.
Here, the crucial insight is that the local area is not the only candi-
date information processor, but that the distributed circuit (or cell
assembly) may act as the unit of information integration (Fuster,
2003; Hebb, 1949; Milner, 1996; Palm, 1982; Pulvermüller, 1996).
Again, the cell assembly or distributed representation can reach into
modality-speciﬁc systems and into multimodal ones too.
In fact, the assumption of multiple semantic systems is neces-
sary to explain the huge body of evidence about category-speciﬁc
semantic deﬁcits (Section 4.4). The notion of trans-area semantic
circuits as integration devices with differential connectivity into
category-speciﬁc semantic systems is compatible with additional
areas generally contributing to semantics, either in the sense of a
‘‘semantic hub’’ or in that of a ‘‘power plug’’ for conceptual and
semantic processing (Patterson et al., 2007; Pulvermüller & Schu-
mann, 1994). The across-the-board semantic deﬁcit seen in seman-
tic dementia provides evidence that the anterior temporal lobe and
underlying subcortical structures, including the amygdalae, which
are damaged in semantic dementia, may provide such a multi-
modal semantic site (Patterson et al., 2007). Note, however, that
there is a degree of semantic category-speciﬁcity in Semantic
Dementia (Gainotti, 2012; Pulvermüller et al., 2010) and that pro-
found bilateral inferior- and anterior-temporal damage caused by
herpes simplex encephalitis sometimes leads to clear category-
speciﬁc semantic deﬁcits (Warrington & Shallice, 1984), thus rais-
ing questions about a temporal semantic area treating all word
types alike. (Pulvermüller, 2013). ((Trends in Cognitive Sciences, in
press)).2.8. Summary
This section clariﬁed some misrepresentations which some-
what encroach the embodiment debate. (1) Embodied theories
do not construe semantics reductively in terms of motor and sen-
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merely have a non-constitutive ‘‘dressing’’ or ‘‘coloring’’ role in
conceptual-semantic processing; this minimally-embodied view
is difﬁcult to reconcile with causal effects of action systems on
semantically-speciﬁc processes. (3) Functional interaction between
action, perception and multimodal systems implies that if one of
these systems processes meaning, the others do so too. (4) Mean-
ing processing without reference is incomplete; symbol grounding
is necessary for semantics. (5) Abstract words, like concrete ones,
need to be explained and grounded in the context of concrete ac-
tions and perceptions; otherwise semantic learning is difﬁcult to
achieve. In addition, (6) common double dissociations between
perception and action are consistent with embodied distributed
circuits, which (7) can act as integration devices for multimodal
semantic information. Therefore, previous criticisms of embodied
approaches (Sections 2.1, 2.5–2.7) cannot be maintained and alter-
native minimally-embodied proposals are insufﬁcient (Sections
2.2–2.4).3. Action–perception theory (APT) of semantic circuits
In my view, the question of whether models of cognition should
be embodied or disembodied is secondary. The primary question in
cognitive science, and, at the same time, one of the most exciting
issues in neuroscience, addresses the mechanisms of cognition.
These mechanisms are brain mechanisms. One can formulate the
answers in terms of box-and-arrow diagrams (Caramazza & Colt-
heart, 2006) or precise algorithms implemented as abstract auto-
mata (Chomsky, 1963), but it appears to represent an advance to
spell out the critical mechanisms in terms of neuronal automata
and circuit dynamics (Buzsáki, 2010; Pulvermüller, 2010).10 In this
sense brain-embodiment is at stake in brain science and in cognitive
science too (Patterson & Plaut, 2009; Plaut & Patterson, 2010). In the
context of the embodiment debate, the to-be-investigated claim
therefore is that, within a neurobiological model of semantics (which
is a cognitive model with a biological basis), it is fruitful and neces-
sary to incorporate action and perception systems of the brain and
mind in the context of an action perception theory (APT).11 As rich connections link both posterior temporal (dorsal) as well as anterior and
inferior temporal (ventral) areas to prefrontal and premotor sites, the model realises3.1. Storing word forms by linking action to perception
Action–perception theories have been offered as a foundation of
language mechanisms in general, and semantics speciﬁcally (All-
port, 1985; Braitenberg & Pulvermüller, 1992; Damasio, 1989; Far-
ah & McClelland, 1991; Fuster, 2003; Humphreys & Forde, 2001;
Mesulam, 1998; Pulvermüller, 1999; Shallice, 1988; Warrington
& McCarthy, 1987). A principal idea is that correlated activity in
sensory and motor brain systems, especially in the cortex, and
pre-existing neuroanatomical connections drive the formation of
major building blocks of cognition, language and meaning. Such
sensorimotor correlation leads to the formation of functional units,
called neuronal assemblies or action perception circuits (APC), with
speciﬁc functional properties (e.g., Braitenberg, 1978; Braitenberg
& Schüz, 1998; Buzsáki, 2010; Palm, 1982; Pulvermüller, 2002b;
Sommer & Wennekers, 2003). An APC has strong internal connec-
tions, and therefore its partial activation will eventually ignite
the circuit (providing a mechanism for recognition), although indi-
vidual ignitions may differ from each other depending on context
and the previous activity state of the network. Upon ignition, APCs
may retain activity for some time (working memory). To control
activity, the system requires a cybernetic regulation mechanism10 Why should this be an advance? Because for understanding and repairing a
device, it is best to speak about its parts and their mechanistic interactions. A box–
arrow diagram is good, but a plot of gear box and con-rod is better.(Braitenberg, 1978; Palm, 1982; Sommer & Wennekers, 2003),
which includes inhibition between circuits and prevents several
APCs from igniting at a time. Such regulation provides a putative
mechanism for lexical competition and attention (Garagnani
et al., 2008). Different APCs may overlap (modeling, for example,
phonologically or semantically similar words, along with ambigu-
ous words, Pulvermüller, 2002b). That action and perception
mechanisms are indeed interlinked is demonstrated by a range of
neuroscience facts, especially the existence of mirror neurons in
premotor and parietal cortex carrying motor and sensory, and
sometimes even higher, goal-deﬁning functions (Arbib, 2005;
Fogassi et al., 2005; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero,
2004; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996; Rizzolatti & Sin-
igaglia, 2010).
Anatomically, primary motor and sensory auditory and visual
areas are not interlinked directly but by way of other areas, includ-
ing ‘‘higher’’ motor and sensory as well as multimodal areas not
dedicated to one speciﬁc sensorimotor system. Speciﬁc reciprocal
next-neighbor and long-distance connections provide between-
area connections. Note that this connection structure contains
abundant information, which is, to a great extent, determined by
the genetic code. Due to learning, sensory and motor circuits
become linked with each other, for example when the child uses
syllables and spoken words and therefore connects motor with
sensory information about speech (Fig. 1a and b). The mechanisms
of sensorimotor linkage, which can be tracked neurophysiologi-
cally in the language learner (Pulvermüller, Kiff, & Shtyrov,
2012), is analogous to the well-known mirror neuron mechanisms
documented in monkeys and probably present in humans too
(Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia,
2010). Consistent with this view, motor and premotor cortex acti-
vation reﬂects speech sound perception (Fadiga, Craighero, Buccin-
o, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Pulvermüller et al., 2006) and functional
changes in the motor system inﬂuences the perceptual classiﬁca-
tion of speech sounds (D’Ausilio et al., 2009).
Basic APCs and mirror mechanisms can transform perceptual
patterns into motor acts, thus supporting repetition, mimicry, mir-
roring or uncontrolled contagious yawning (Fig. 1a and b). To mod-
el social interaction and language, additional mechanisms are
necessary that link linguistic actions into sequences and words
and larger constructions to meaning (Fig. 1c and d, Arbib, 2010; Ja-
cob & Jeannerod, 2005; Jeannerod, 2006).
Crucially, the mechanisms of interlinking action and perception
representations has been investigating by neurocomputational
simulation studies, which help to put ‘‘embodied’’ language models
on solid mechanistic ground (see, for example, Arbib, 2010; Bonai-
uto, Rosta, & Arbib, 2005; Madden, Hoen, & Dominey, 2010; West-
ermann & Reck Miranda, 2004). In recent computer simulations of
the underlying neuromechanistic processes, we used neural net-
works mimicking the neuroanatomy of the left-perisylvian lan-
guage cortex to investigate, at the neurocomputational level, the
formation of action–perception circuits for spoken word forms
(Garagnani et al., 2008; Wennekers et al., 2006). The neurocompu-
tational model realized important features of neuroanatomical
connectivity, especially connections between primary motor and
auditory areas by way of inferior-frontal premotor and prefrontal
and superior–temporal auditory parabelt and belt areas (Glasser
& Rilling, 2008; Petrides & Pandya, 2009; Saur et al., 2008).11 Cor-the same action–perception links for phonological and lexical processing in both
dorsal and ventral connection pathways. There is, in fact, no neuroscientiﬁc a priori
why only the dorsal pathway should specialise in phonological or lexical processing
(see Dewitt & Rauschecker, 2012; Pulvermüller et al., 2006; Uppenkamp, Johnsrude,
Norris, Marslen-Wilson, & Patterson, 2006).
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processes of speaking and simultaneously hearing a word) yielded
coordinated waves of activation travelling through this network
architecture. Due to realistic Hebbian learning mechanisms, the cor-
related inter-area patterns of activation led to synaptic strengthen-
ing and neuronal circuit formation. Consequently, the resultant
circuits included neurons in sensory and motor areas but, in addi-
tion, neurons in areas through which connections between sensory
and motor areas are being relayed, including, for example, multi-
modal inferior-prefrontal and auditory parabelt areas. Thus, neuro-
anatomy provided the necessary substrate, learning strengthened
the links, and the results were multimodal circuits connecting motor
and sensory neurons by way of other neurons in a range of supra-
and multimodal relay areas (premotor, prefrontal, parabelt and belt).
Note that because partaking neurons are being integrated into ac-
tion–perception circuits, APCs, they acquire multimodal response
properties.
APCs provide a cortical basis of working memory (Fuster, 1995,
2003; Verduzco-Flores, Bodner, Ermentrout, Fuster, & Zhou, 2009;
Zipser, Kehoe, Littlewort, & Fuster, 1993). Critically, neurons in re-
lay areas are in the center of circuits bridging between sensory and
motor cortices. Therefore, these relay area neurons receive ‘‘sup-
port’’ (i.e. neuronal activation) from both sensory and motor ends
of the network. In contrast, neurons in the circuit periphery in the
motor cortex or the auditory cortex would receive such within-
assembly support only from one side, i.e., ‘‘top-down’’ from the
higher areas. Because of their stronger neuronal support, neurons
in the relay areas are able to retain activity long after stimulation,
thus making them a substrate of working memory. Because of their
weaker support, circuit neurons in sensorimotor areas play less of a
role in working memory processes. These mechanistic consider-
ations predict a process of memory disembodiment, which, within
APCs, makes working memory processes move away from sensori-
motor areas. As the most ‘‘central’’ parts of the circuits, in prefron-
tal and auditory parabelt, hold activity for the longest period of
time, these sections of the circuits are most crucial for storing
information about word forms that co-occur with each other, that
is for the storage of combinatorial semantic information (Garag-
nani & Pulvermüller, 2013; Pulvermüller & Garagnani, submitted
for publication). Note that this explains ‘‘disembodiment’’ in terms
of neurobiological mechanisms.
3.2. Storing meaning by interlinking action–perception circuits
Syllables, word forms and verbal utterances do not stand alone.
As they are embedded into context, their neuronal representations
link up with other circuits. Two types of learning are most impor-
tant, which have sometimes been called word–word and word–
world learning, respectively.3.2.1. Word–word correlation learning
The meaning of any word can be deﬁned combinatorially by
relating it to other words with which it typically occurs. Hence,
word co-occurrence in strings and texts provides the crucial infor-
mation extracted and systematized by combinatorial approaches
to semantics (Kintsch & Mangalath, 2011; Landauer & Dumais,
1997). How would brains map such combinatorial information?
Hebbian neuronal correlation learning algorithms (Artola & Singer,
1993; Caporale & Dan, 2008)12 can map which words frequently oc-12 Hebb-type correlation learning or probability mapping algorithms typically
include synaptic strengthening when two connected neurons ﬁre simultaneously
(‘‘ﬁre together-wire together’’ rule) and ‘‘anti-Hebb’’ synaptic weakening when one of
the neurons ﬁres and the other is silent (‘‘out of sync-delink’’ rule). In addition, the
precise timing of pre-and postsynaptic spikes can also be taken into account. In all
cases, probability of ﬁring is mapped onto connection structure.cur together and which do not (Pulvermüller, 2002a). Words that
frequently co-occur would therefore be bound together into se-
quences (Fig. 1c, Pulvermüller & Knoblauch, 2009). So, trivially, prob-
ability mapping stores the probability of symbol chains. However,
we found in simulation studies with associative networks replicating
certain aspects of cortical neuroanatomy, that, over and above prob-
ability mapping, the frequent mutual substitutions between syntac-
tic constituents in similar syntactic–semantic contexts leads to the
formation of discrete combinatorial neuronal assemblies now storing
sequences at rather abstract levels, as sequences of classes of lexical
items or construction schemas. Therefore, purely based on the com-
binatorial information about their frequent occurrence in noun-con-
texts, verbs can be grouped together, and, likewise, nouns group
together based on their occurrence in similar contexts. Crucially, a
general combinatorial link develops joining together the frequently
recombined nouns and verbs (Knoblauch & Pulvermüller, 2005). This
general link is the basis for generalization to novel combinations of
lexical items. As mentioned in Section 3.1 above, linking areas in
anterior-inferiorfrontal and auditory parabelt areas are best suited
for storing semantic word–word correlations, because they house
the majority of memory-active ‘‘core’’ neurons of APCs (Fig. 1c,
Garagnani & Pulvermüller, 2013; Pulvermüller & Garagnani, submit-
ted for publication). It indeed makes sense to speak of a mechanism
of combinatorial disembodiment in this context.
Although such a combinatorial approach may be said to support
combinatorial mechanisms at the syntactic level only, it is impor-
tant to note that the networks in question also store and represent
genuinely semantic information (Pulvermüller & Knoblauch, 2009).
Closer analysis of combinatorial networks mapping noun-verb co-
occurrence shows that semantic subgroups of thematically related
nouns and verbs develop much stronger links than average nouns
and verbs, so that combinatorial information mapped by the net-
work is indeed both syntactic and semantic in nature. An action–
perception theory with correlation mapping mechanisms in fact
implies a combinatorial semantic system. Although it is composed
of action–perception circuits the system stores combinatorial
information and provides generalization at an abstract combinato-
rial-semantic level (Pulvermüller, 2010).
3.2.2. Word–world correlation learning
So far, semantic learning in a disembodied word–word correla-
tion mapping sense has been addressed, thus still leaving the
semantic grounding problem unsolved (Harnad, 1990; Searle,
1980). However, in a brain-like mechanistic device, such grounding
is also implied by neuronal learning principles. If a word is typi-
cally used to speak about an object, the typical referent objects
may frequently be present during word learning; the neuronal cor-
relates of object and word would therefore be co-activated and, be-
cause of Hebbian learning, tighten their neuronal connections, thus
forming a higher-order semantic circuit which binds together two
kinds of action–perception circuits: that for the word form (or
symbol) and that for the referent object (Fig. 1d). In this case, visual
representations of referent objects in the middle and temporal lobe
are of particular relevance. For sound-, taste- or odor-related
words, neuron sets in auditory, gustatory and olfactory areas are
implied. Circuits of neurons in different modality-speciﬁc systems
linked by way of long-distance cortico-cortical connections bind
multimodal semantic knowledge crossing sensory and motor
modalities (FISH example in Section 2.4). That higher multimodal
relay areas are involved, apart from modality speciﬁc ones
(Fig. 1d), follows from the fact that neuronal connections between
modality systems frequently switch over in speciﬁc higher associ-
ation ‘‘relay’’ cortices or convergence zones (Damasio, 1989).
If a word is typically used to speak about one type of action, the
prototypical word-related actions may frequently be performed –
either by the learner him/herself or by a different individual. In this
Fig. 1. Action perception circuits, APCs, and semantic mechanisms. (a) Modality-speciﬁc neuron sets in primary auditory and motor cortex (A1, M1). (b) Based on
corticocortical connections and correlated activity patterns in motor and sensory areas, APCs develop for spoken word forms; these include neurons in primary areas and in
relay areas bridging between them (inferior PM (premotor) and PF (prefrontal); superior–temporal AB (auditory belt) and PB (parabelt)). (c) Combinatorial semantic
information is laid down by strengthening of links between PF and PB neurons of APCs, leading to storage of action chains and hierarchies. (d) Referential object-related and
action information is semantically bound to words by way of long-distance links between APCs for word forms and concepts; the illustrated conceptual circuit involves
neurons in lateral M1, PM and PF motor/executive cortex and in V1 (primary visual), HV (higher visual) and VA (visual association) cortex in the ventral object processing
stream. Semantic links can be mediated by ‘‘abstract’’ logical circuits (Section 4.3).
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symbolic, word-form related circuit and in that of the word-related
motor schema. In this case, action representations join together
with symbol circuits and potentially additional multimodal per-
ceptual circuits. The motor schema circuits likely include neurons
in the motor system of the human brain (Fig. 1d, Jeannerod et al.,
1995).
Such a mechanism might be useful for binding meaning to
words like ‘‘run’’ or ‘‘lick’’. If word-related actions are typically per-
formed by humans (but not for nonhuman action, cf. ‘‘barking’’),
action knowledge will be tied into the semantic circuit. Action
knowledge rarely exhausts the meaning of an action word, as there
is typically additional semantic knowledge about executive and
sensory aspects of the word-related actions, for example the visual
properties of the action, knowledge about the possible objects theaction can be performed on, its goals, and so on (Glenberg & Gal-
lese, 2012; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010).
There is an important difference between motor movements
(also called ‘‘basic actions’’, Danto, 1965) and actions with a some-
times far-reaching goal (e.g., Fogassi et al., 2005). In action percep-
tion theory (APT), this difference is modeled by different types of
action representations, either a single APC – the word form ‘‘jump’’,
which connects the motor schema for a sequence of articulations
with an acoustic–phonological perceptual schema – or a connected
set of APCs including both the linguistic form, its semantic action
or object-related schema and the representation of typical conse-
quences (see also Glenberg & Gallese, 2012). So if somebody offers
me crisps BY showing me the open bag and uttering the word
‘‘crisps?’’, the utterance’s (basic action’s) representation includes
the word form circuit with its linked object representation (refer-
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tion–semantic representation embeds this object representation
into that of the expected action to be performed on the object
and its verbal correlate (combinatorial semantic linkage mecha-
nism, shown in Fig. 1c). Hence basic and goal-deﬁned actions have
separated interlinked mechanisms in this type of model.13 Note,
furthermore, that the serial and hierarchical linkage of action sche-
mas (Fig. 1c) is also capable, in principle, of capturing sequences of
actions performed by different individuals, for example the dialogue
schema of a request being followed by the passing-on of the re-
quested object by the dialogue partner and ﬁnally thanking (Egor-
ova, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, submitted for publication; Pickering
& Garrod, 2004). Developing a neurobiological theory of dialogue
will be a prime target for the future.
A symbol-related APC will therefore ‘‘embody’’ a range of circuit
parts storing action and perception schemas semantically related
to a symbol. Whenever it ignites, the APC activates a selection of
its semantic schemas, preferentially the most prototypical ones
and those best primed by context. Within each circuit, the strength
of connection (driven by correlation and thus typicality) and the
priming status of the network before ignition determine on each
occasion which circuit parts will partake in the ignition process.
Note, once again, the importance of inhibitory mechanisms here,
as for example in case of an ambiguous word form (such as ‘‘bank’’)
only one of the alternative overlapping circuits will be allowed to
ignite (Pulvermüller, 2002b).
3.2.3. Word–word plus word–world learning
As word–word and word–world correlation learning are speci-
ﬁed mechanistically, it is important to consider the joint contribu-
tion of both to semantic learning. Words are frequently learned
through context, without reference objects or relevant actions
being present (Kintsch, 2008). Semantic learning by context does
not only imply that word form representations are being joined to-
gether by combinatorial circuits, it also implies interaction be-
tween referential-semantic and word form circuits. Due to
neuronal correlation, the word form circuit of the new to-be-
learned word form (e.g. ‘‘unicorn’’) may link with (part of) the
semantic circuits of a previously acquired words (‘‘horse’’, ‘‘horn’’),
thus resulting in attachment of referential-semantic neurons to the
new word’s circuit (Pulvermüller, 2002a). In this view, semantic
learning in context entails that semantic grounding of some words
and concepts previously learned in action and object contexts ex-
erts ‘‘grounding contagion’’ on other words and concepts of the
vocabulary. Note that a process similar to imagery (or intentional
simulation) might play a role here, whereby the listener actively
thinks of a scene, action or object related to known language units
when hearing a novel item. However, as an alternative, the invol-
untary process of semantic understanding of meaningful language
may instantaneously activate semantically-related action or object
representations that consequently become available for semantic
grounding of novel symbols occurring in the same context. Combi-
natorially-grounded semantic learning or ‘‘grounding contagion’’
may play a role for the large set of vocabulary items learned from
context, in the absence of referent objects or relevant actions (cf.
‘‘symbolic theft’’ or ‘‘parasitic’’ semantic learning, Cangelosi, Greco,
& Harnad, 2000; Cangelosi et al., 2002; Pulvermüller, 2002a).
Correlation learning implies that, for words occurring in very
variable object and action contexts, any links between the repre-
sentations of word form and objects/actions remain weak (Pulver-
müller, 1999). This is especially important for words and
morphemes with primarily grammatical function, that is, gram-13 Some colleagues claimed incorrectly that action perception approaches, espe-
cially the mirror neuron theory, cannot account for the distinction between basic and
goal-deﬁned actions (e.g., Hickok, 2010; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008).matical function words and afﬁxes. As they typically line up with
words from speciﬁc grammatical categories, they are being joined
into the combinatorial network, however without acquiring their
own semantic links to perceptual or action schemes. The referen-
tial-semantic detachment of function words and afﬁxes is a case
of ‘‘disembodiment’’ and follows from neurobiological correlation
learning.
3.2.4. Logical circuits for abstraction
For a relevant subclass of words, the sets of basic actions or ob-
jects they relate to are so heterogeneous and variable that search-
ing for common features or a prototypical perceptual schema is a
challenge. The famous example of ‘‘games’’ has been highlighted
(Section 2.4). Consider furthermore the range of objects that can
be called ‘‘beautiful’’, which may include ﬂowers, faces and scenes
such as a sunrise. Likewise, the actions one can perform to ‘‘free’’
somebody are equally heterogeneous: unlocking a door or remov-
ing handcuffs may do the job as does a sentence spoken by a judge.
Searching for common features may work to a degree (e.g., by
using the ‘‘out of a container’’ metaphor, Lakoff, 1987; Langacker,
1991), but there may still be need to store the knowledge that a
heterogeneous range of alternative objects or actions fall under a gi-
ven abstract concept. A neurobiological mechanism for realizing
such or, or either-or, connections between object types and action
schemas can be provided by logical circuits. Depending on its con-
nections with other neurons and its activation threshold, a basic
type of model neuron can be described as a logical unit calculating
AND, OR, or EITHER-OR functions (Kleene, 1956; McCulloch & Pitts,
1943). A description in terms of logical conjunction and disjunction
may not be fully appropriate for the functionality of individual
neurons (as suggested by McCulloch and Pitts) but such a descrip-
tion has been discussed at the higher level of large neuronal assem-
bly interaction (see, for example, Bussey, Saksida, & Murray, 2005;
Hayon et al., 2005; Palm, 1982). Accordingly, several APCs converg-
ing on a target postsynaptic APC by way of strong connections may
each be able to reliably ignite the latter, thus representing a prob-
abilistic OR link or disjunction. If links are weak, several simulta-
neous inputs will be required to activate the postynaptic circuit,
thus representing an AND link or conjunction. Disjunction links be-
tween APCs are especially handy for implementing, at the neuronal
circuit level, the many-to-one relationship between action and per-
ceptual instantiations of abstract meaning and the word form
expressing such variable meaning in different contexts (Pulver-
müller, 2008). Note that as OR or EITHER-OR circuits need to com-
pute input from a range of APCs, the logical key circuits can be
assumed to lie outside sensorimotor areas, in adjacent prefrontal
and anterior-temporal areas where sensory and motor pathways
converge (Fig. 2). A move of abstract semantic representations
away from sensorimotor systems may therefore be driven by the
great variability of action–perception instantiations of speciﬁc
types of abstract concepts. The term variability disembodiment
may be appropriate in this context. A resultant empirical predic-
tion is that abstract word meanings will differ in their brain pro-
cessing loci dependent on their variability of usages (see also
Pulvermüller 2013).
3.3. Summary
A mechanistic model of word form and semantic processing is
described brieﬂy, with special emphasis on the integration of com-
binatorial and action–perception mechanisms. The following
points are key to the embodiment debate: (1) The neurobiological
mechanism of correlation learning implies semantic learning at the
level of combinatorial word–word learning and at that of referen-
tial word–world learning, with signiﬁcant interactions between
the two. (2) Interlinked and overlapping APCs provide mechanisms
Fig. 2. Possible neuronal circuitry underlying modality speciﬁc semantic abstrac-
tion processes in the human brain. Abstract words that can be used to speak about a
range of profoundly different actions (e.g., ‘‘to free’’) have cell assemblies including
semantic neurons that act as disjunction units with input from a range of neurons
controlling speciﬁc types of context-embedded body-related actions which are
possible instantiations of freeing (to open a door, to unlock handcuffs, to ransom).
Such abstract action–semantic neurons are located in prefrontal cortex. Similar
abstract visual semantic neurons performing disjunction computations on visual
object representations are in anterior areas of the inferior temporal ‘‘what’’ stream
of visual processing; these implement the computation of visually-grounded
abstract meaning (e.g., for ‘‘beauty’’ its instantiations as beautiful sunset, ﬂower,
face).
14 This differential laterality seems to be independent of handedness and may be
driven, in part, by the observation of others’ actions (see Hauk & Pulvermuller, 2011).
96 F. Pulvermüller / Brain & Language 127 (2013) 86–103for sequences and hierarchies of words, actions and concepts. (3)
Neurobiological mechanisms that are combinatorial and logical
in nature are available for representing variable abstract concepts.
In this context, mechanisms of ‘‘disembodiment’’ – deﬁned as
movement of critical processes away from sensorimotor systems
towards multimodal association cortex – are explained by (a)
memory dynamics, (b) combinatorial processes (which require
memory) and (c) variability of word usage. Thus, although all
semantic processes are grounded in action and perception, only a
subset remain ‘‘embodied’’ in action and perception processes,
with memory, symbol combination and variability of usage driving
‘‘disembodiment’’. A key feature of the action perception approach
is its explanatory character, i.e. that it aims to derive and explain
mechanisms and localizations from established neuroanatomical
and neurophysiological principles and knowledge.
4. Some evidence relevant to the embodiment debate
4.1. Activation of sensorimotor systems in semantic processing
A range of studies showed that, for speciﬁc types of words and
sentences, semantically-related local activation is present in per-
ceptual and action-related systems of the brain (Binder & Desai,
2011; Kemmerer & Gonzalez-Castillo, 2010; Kiefer & Pulvermüller,
2012; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010). The visual system becomes ac-
tive when subjects passively read visually-related words and, more
speciﬁcally, different areas in ventral temporal cortex are engaged
when subjects understand words denoting color and form, faces
and places, or visually-perceived movement (e.g., Aziz-Zadeh
et al., 2008; Pulvermüller & Hauk, 2006; Rueschemeyer, Glenberg,
Kaschak, Mueller, & Friederici, 2010; Simmons et al., 2007). Words
semantically related to sounds (‘‘bell’’, Kiefer, Sim, Herrnberger,
Grothe, & Hoenig, 2008; Kiefer et al., 2012), odor (‘‘cinnamon’’,
Gonzalez et al., 2006) or taste (‘‘salt’’, Barrós-Loscertales et al.,
2012) activate their respective modality-speciﬁc perceptual areas.
Also, activation of motor systems during processing of language
semantically related to action knowledge has been demonstrated
in a range of studies. Of special relevance is the ﬁnding of ‘‘semantic
somatotopy’’, the activation of motor and premotor cortex accord-ing to the body-related action meaning of language. Many actions
are typically performed with different parts of the body. KICKING,
PICKING or LICKING are actions normally involving the legs, hands
or tongue. This is not to say that there might not be exceptions,
non-prototypical usages of these words: ‘‘kicking’’ in table football
is certainly a hand/arm activity and one may sometimes ‘‘speak’’ by
moving the hands, or ‘‘write’’ with one’s foot in the sand. Therefore,
not any, but the prototypical meaning (see, Rosch & Mervis, 1975) of
words such as ‘‘kick’’, ‘‘pick’’ and ‘‘lick’’, and equally ‘‘walk’’,
‘‘write’’, and ‘‘talk’’, has a body-part implication, and semantic rat-
ings of native speakers bolster this claim (Pulvermüller, Hummel,
& Härle, 2001). As mentioned, the body part implication does not
exhaust the semantics of these terms, as, for example, ‘‘walk’’,
‘‘stroll’’ and ‘‘march’’ have the same body part implication but re-
late to different (sets of) motor schemas. However, the speciﬁc sig-
niﬁcance of semantic somatotopy comes from the fact that
theoretical neurobiological consideration for the ﬁrst time allowed
for specifying the loci of speciﬁc semantic brain activations, so that
motor localizer tasks in which subjects did in fact move parts of
their body, for example a ﬁnger or a foot, could be used to a priori
predict semantic activation.
If the action a word, phrase or sentence is typically used to
speak about is performed by moving the face, arms or legs, com-
prehension of these linguistic units will activate the concordant
part of the motor system. The word ‘‘kick’’ would therefore activate
foot/leg motor regions and ‘‘grasp’’ hand/arm regions. A range of
studies found such somatotopic semantic mapping (for example,
Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, & Iacoboni, 2006; Boulenger et al.,
2009; Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Kemmerer, Castillo,
Talavage, Patterson, & Wiley, 2008; Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, &
Tyler, 2009; Tettamanti et al., 2005; Tomasino, Werner, Weiss, &
Fink, 2007). The speciﬁc signiﬁcance of semantic somatotopy
comes from the fact that neurobiological theory of language for
the ﬁrst time allowed for specifying the loci of speciﬁc semantic
brain activations, so that motor localizer tasks in which subjects
did in fact move parts of their body, for example a ﬁnger or a foot,
could be used to a priori predict semantic activation. Therefore, for
the ﬁrst time, a brain locus of facets of semantics could be pre-
dicted correctly a priori with a degree of precision. Together with
other evidence (González et al., 2006; Kiefer et al., 2008; Simmons
et al., 2007), this ﬁnding provided unprecedented support for the-
ories of category-speciﬁc semantic processing in the brain (Barsa-
lou, 2008; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Pulvermüller, 2005).
Predictions are not precise in a millimeter sense but there seems
to be signiﬁcant spatial overlap of motor-related and word-elicited
activations (Hauk et al., 2004). Somatotopic semantic mappings
have been reported for sentences, phrases and verbs, in English,
French, Italian, German, and Finnish. More recently, a degree of
somatotopic activation in the motor system has also been found
for nouns related to objects that respectively afford mouth and
hand movements, that is, food and tool names (Carota, Moseley,
& Pulvermüller, 2012). Strength and/or location of activity in fron-
toparietal sensorimotor systems varies according to other aspects
of word meaning too, (Kemmerer et al., 2008; Rueschemeyer, van
Rooij, Lindemann, Willems, & Bekkering, 2010; van Dam, Ruesche-
meyer, & Bekkering, 2010; Yang, Shu, Bi, Liu, & Wang, 2011). For
example, word-evoked motor activation can be left-lateralized if
actions are typically performed with one hand (‘‘to write’’) or more
bilateral in case of bi-manual actions (‘‘to clap’’, Hauk & Pulvermul-
ler, 2011).14 Furthermore, the subjects’ hand preference and motor
proﬁciency modulates language-induced semantic activation in mo-
tor systems and adjacent areas (Beilock, Lyons, Mattarella-Micke,
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2009; Willems, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2010). These results indicate
that semantic properties of linguistic materials along with personal
learning history (see Fuster, 1999) are reﬂected in the sensorimotor
system’s response.
To what degree do these activations reﬂecting semantically-re-
lated action and perception processes depend on the task applied?
Although semantic motor systems activation to words, phrases and
sentences has been found in passive speech perception (Pulver-
müller, Shtyrov et al., 2005; Shtyrov, Hauk, & Pulvermüller,
2004), passive reading (Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2004; Hauk et al.,
2004; Tettamanti et al., 2005), lexical decision (Pulvermüller,
Hummel & Härle, 2001; Rueschemeyer, van Rooij, et al., 2010),
semantic decision (Kemmerer et al., 2008) and imagery tasks
(Tomasino et al., 2007; Willems, Toni, Hagoort, & Casasanto,
2010), it is not omnipresent when action words or sentences are
in the input. The repetition of stimulus words within one experi-
ment decreases area-speciﬁc activation to word categories (Kiefer,
2005), thus making it less likely to obtain semantic category differ-
ences in brain activation (see, e.g., Pulvermüller, Cook, & Hauk,
2012; Tomasino, Fink, Sparing, Dafotakis, & Weiss, 2008; Tomasino
et al., 2007). An overt motor task, especially when it involved the
right hand or foot, brings about task-related motor activity which
may override ﬁne-grained semantic activations (for discussion,
see Pulvermüller, Hummel, et al., 2001). For example, Willems
et al. used different overt movements with different tasks (eye
closing and imagery vs. button press preparation and lexical deci-
sion, Willems, Toni, et al., 2010); their task differences (including
the absence of activation differences between word categories in
hand-motor areas during lexical decisions expressed by ﬁnger
movements) may therefore be a consequence of preparatory motor
processes. Sound/letter detection tasks may also mask semantic
motor system activation (Tomasino et al., 2007), as they put an
emphasis on phonological processing, which has been shown to
be manifest in the motor system too (Section 3.2.1). Note that
the processing of phonemes such as /p/ and /t/, even in perception,
engages different parts of the motor system (D’Ausilio et al., 2009;
Pulvermüller et al., 2006), thus causing phonologically-related
somatotopic activation, which may interfere with semantic soma-
totopy. A study by Poste et al. failed to replicate semantic somatot-
opy when looking at haemodynamic responses in motor and
premotor ﬁelds in a ROI15-by-ROI manner, although, as signiﬁcantly
larger face-word than leg-word responses were present in the pre-
motor face ROI and the reverse tendency was suggested by the
leg-area data (cf. Postle, McMahon, Ashton, Meredith, & de Zubica-
ray, 2008), it may still be that analyzing data from all ROIs elicited
by different action word types could yield reliable interaction effects.
Overall, a majority of studies document semantic somatotopy to
words and constructions across tasks and languages although some
reports failed to do so or showed task or context interferences. A safe
way to prevent semantic motor activation is the use of overt motor
tasks involving the critical body parts and an emphasis on phonolog-
ical processing.
The fact that semantic somatotopy persisted in passive tasks
and sometimes even under distraction indicates a degree of auto-
maticity of the motor and sensory system activations in semantic
processing (Pulvermüller, 2005). What should not, and has not,
been claimed, however, is that sensorimotor systems activation
is left unchanged by task demand or context. Sensorimotor systems
activation in semantic processing seems to be automatic insofar as
such activation is being elicited even if subjects do not attend to
linguistic stimuli. Different tasks, contexts and attention levels
may however enhance, reduce or even override sensorimotor sys-15 ROI – Region of Interest.tems activations that reﬂect semantic properties of stimulus utter-
ances. Cancellation of semantic motor systems dynamics is not
surprising in the case of massive motor activation when moving
a ﬁnger or arm, and can be explained in a straightforward manner
in the sense of a ceiling effect (Pulvermüller et al., 2001). More
interesting types of task- and context-dependent modulations of
sensorimotor and semantic activation have been reported by a
range of studies (Aravena et al., 2012; Hoenig, Sim, Bochev, Herrn-
berger, & Kiefer, 2008; Papeo, Corradi-Dell’Acqua, & Rumiati, 2011;
Pulvermüller, Cook, et al., 2012; Tomasino, Weiss, & Fink, 2010;
Tomasino et al., 2007; van Elk, van Schie, Zwaan, & Bekkering,
2010). These results indicate that, over and above meaning aspects
of individual words, the context of tasks and constructions in
which stimulus words are embedded contributes to motor system
activation. However, it is not sufﬁcient to state that sensorimotor
semantic activation is ‘‘ﬂexible’’ (Willems & Casasanto, 2011);
rather, the explanation of speciﬁc patterns of modulation of seman-
tic effects is desirable on the background of neurobiological theory.
Such explanations may recur to the activation balance between
‘‘embodied’’ semantic and ‘‘disembodied’’ linguistic circuits, for
example those underpinning grammatical items, including func-
tion words and inﬂectional afﬁxes (Pulvermüller, Cook, et al.,
2012). An explanation of the modulation of sensorimotor circuit
activations with attention levels has been offered in the context
of an explicit neurocomputational model (Garagnani et al., 2008).
Fig. 3 summarizes results of fMRI studies of action word, phrase
and sentence processing in different tasks and languages, which
show a degree of agreement across labs and studies (Carota, Mose-
ley, & Pulvermüller, 2012).
4.2. Relative speed of general semantic and speciﬁc sensorimotor
semantic activation
Semantically-related activation of sensory and motor brain sys-
tems has frequently been revealed by haemodynamic neuroimag-
ing, especially fMRI. The majority of these studies suggests an
involvement of brain areas important for action and perception
in the processing of words and sentences with action- and ob-
ject-related meaning. However, because of the rather sluggish nat-
ure of the hemodynamic responses, fMRI does not allow one to
distinguish between immediate comprehension processes and later,
second-order, ‘‘epiphenomenal’’ post-understanding inference (see
Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). Thus, time is of the essence and the
critical test needs to scrutinize, with millisecond precision, the
time course of activation spreading, asking whether sensorimotor
systems activations occur at or after the earliest semantic activa-
tions known to date.
Semantic processes were once thought to ﬁrst kick in around
400 ms after a critical stimulus word comes in, being ﬁrst reﬂected
in the N400 response of the event-related potential (Kutas &
Federmeier, 2000). However, recent investigation revealed early
responses indexing meaning processing at the word and sentence
level (Chanceaux, Vitu, Bendahman, Thorpe, & Grainger, 2012;
Hauk, Davis, Ford, Pulvermüller, & Marslen-Wilson, 2006; Penol-
azzi, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2007; Pulvermüller, Assadollahi & El-
bert, 2001; Sereno, Brewer, & O’Donnell, 2003), which precede
classic N400 effects (Barber & Kutas, 2007; Pulvermüller, Shtyrov,
& Hauk, 2009). Such early physiological signs of semantics emerge
between 100 and 250 ms after the critical word (or, in sentences,
after the word critical for understanding a larger construction)
can ﬁrst be recognized.16 Crucially, the ﬁrst sensorimotor system
activations fell in the same early time window, thus arguing against16 Please note the recent discovery of even faster, ‘‘ultra-rapid’’ processes related to
cohort-activation or lexical access (MacGregor, Pulvermüller, van Casteren, & Shtyrov,
2012), which raises the possibility that even earlier semantic processes may exist.
Fig. 3. Review of brain activation loci (most highly signiﬁcant voxels) in frontoparietal cortex differentially activated by face-, arm-, and leg-related words, phrases and
sentences across studies and tasks. Note the somatotopic pattern of activation in pre- (but not post-) central cortex with inferior face-semantic (in green), lateral arm-
semantic (red) and dorsal leg-semantic activations (blue, for detailed discussion, see Carota et al., 2012).
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and sensorimotor system activations speciﬁc to semantic categories.
Semantic activations to action words emerged in the motor system
(Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2004; Pulvermüller, Härle, & Hummel,
2000; Pulvermüller et al., 2001, 2005; Shtyrov et al., 2004)17 and
to visually-related word categories in the visual system (Moscoso
Del Prado Martin, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2006). In parallel, behav-
ioral studies also indicated an early semantically-driven emergence
of motor system involvement (Boulenger et al., 2006). It therefore
appears that fast activations of action–perception systems are quick
enough to reﬂect true comprehension.
A direct comparison of general and category-speciﬁc semantic
activations in the human brain is possible using paradigms where
both play a role. It has been discovered that abstract idiomatic sen-
tences activate certain prefrontal and anterior-temporal areas
more strongly than concrete ones (Boulenger et al., 2009; Lauro,
Tettamanti, Cappa, & Papagno, 2008). Such multimodal cortex acti-
vation may be an index of ‘‘disembodied’’ semantic understanding
of aspects of the abstract idioms’ meanings. In addition, aspects of
the ‘‘embodied’’ meaning of action words included in both idioms
and literal sentences (for example ‘‘grasp’’ in ‘‘she grasped the idea/
apple’’ or ‘‘kick’’ in ‘‘she kicked the habit/ball’’) was manifest in mo-
tor system activation (Boulenger et al., 2009). As such motor sys-
tem activation reﬂecting the meaning of constituent action
words was present at the point in time when idiomatic and literal
sentence meaning were disambiguated, the data seem to suggest a
degree of semantic compositional processing at the point in time
when sentence meaning was accessed. This addresses a long-
standing discussion in semantic theory about whether composi-
tional semantic processes play a role in idiom comprehension or
the construction is semantically accessed as a whole without
decomposition into its parts (Goldberg, 2006; Lakoff, 1987). Now,
crucially, precise mapping-in-time using magnetoencephalogra-
phy (MEG) showed that the brain correlates of idiomaticy and
those of constituent word meaning occurred at the same time, at
150–200 ms after onset of the critical, sentence disambiguating
words (not the action words, but rather the critical words ‘‘idea’’
and ‘‘apple’’ in the above examples; see Fig. 4). These results fur-
ther conﬁrm early semantic activations with the same latency in
sensorimotor cortices and in cortical systems that are not speciﬁc17 However, some work did not conﬁrm early motor system activation to action
word processing, but found such activation later (e.g., Papeo, Vallesi, Isaja, & Rumiati,
2009).to sensorimotor modalities. They argue against the possibility that
sensorimotor semantic activation might be an epiphenomenon,
just following upon, or overspilling from, semantic system activa-
tion elsewhere (see Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). If prefrontal and
anterior-temporal activations are interpreted as indexes of
‘‘disembodied’’ symbolic system activation, they are manifest to-
gether with semantic activation of the action system. At the
semantic level, the results suggest that compositional semantic
processing of action-related words (precentral cortex) and
whole-construction semantic processes (prefrontal and anterior-
temporal areas) simultaneously and jointly contribute to idiom
comprehension.
4.3. Causal role of sensorimotor systems in semantic processing
Could activity in modality-speciﬁc motor and sensory systems
have causal effects on semantic processing, for example speciﬁcally
on the processing of words with one type of meaning? For words
related to different body parts, this question has been addressed
by direct magnetic stimulation to motor cortex. One may predict
a cross-over double dissociation of magnetic stimulation to ﬁnger-
and foot-loci on the recognition of words typically used to speak
about arm or leg actions. Since such differential inﬂuence of pri-
mary motor cortex activation on action word processing has been
documented, it is clear that the processes of lexical and semantic
access can be inﬂuenced by activity in the motor system (Pulver-
müller, Hauk, et al., 2005). Further data conﬁrmed a causal effect
of motor systems stimulation or engagement on language process-
ing and on the processing of speciﬁc semantic word types (Bou-
lenger et al., 2006; Dalla Volta, Gianelli, Campione, & Gentilucci,
2009; Liuzzi et al., 2010; Shebani & Pulvermüller, 2013; Willems,
Labruna, D’Esposito, Ivry, & Casasanto, 2011). Similar causal effects
exist between systems for visual perception and processing of
verbs related to motion (Meteyard, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2007;
Meteyard, Zokaei, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2008).
4.4. Necessity of sensorimotor systems for semantic processing
Whether or not lesions to the motor system indeed cause a
deﬁcit, that is, a clear impairment, in processing action-language,
and motor systems can therefore be considered necessary for pro-
cessing action–semantic word classes, is a matter of debate (see
Arevalo, Baldo, & Dronkers, 2012; Kalenine, Buxbaum, & Coslett,
2010). Hardly denied can be the clear evidence that patient
Fig. 4. Time course of brain activation elicited by the sentence-disambiguating word in literal vs. idiomatic sentences (columns on the left) and in sentences (both idiomatic
and literal) including hand- vs. leg-related action words (e.g., she grasped/kicked the idea, columns on the right). Activation differences between idiomatic and literal
sentences were present in dorsolateral-prefrontal and temporopolar areas (yellow circles on the left) already 150–250 ms after the onset of the critical word (e.g., she grasped
the idea; he kicked the habit). At the same time, the action-related meaning of action words included in the sentences was manifest in motor system activation (yellow circles
on the right). These results indicate simultaneous processing of the stored meaning of constructions and of that of (some of) the words these constructions are composed of.
The data refute the suggestion that motor systems activation results from overspill in other semantic areas (adopted from Boulenger, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2012).
Fig. 5. Moving the hands and legs according to a complex motor scheme impairs
working memory for arm- and leg-related words, respectively (adopted from
Shebani & Pulvermüller, 2013). These results (given as errors transformed into z-
scores) indicate that resources in cortical motor systems engaged by complex body-
part-speciﬁc movements are necessary for processing of semantically congruent
action words.
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motor cognition deﬁcit and, speciﬁcally, a deﬁcit in action verb
processing. This has been documented in victims of stroke, Motor
Neuron Disease, Parkinson’s Disease, and other types of dementia
(Bak & Chandran, 2012; Bak, O’Donovan, Xuereb, Boniface, & Hod-
ges, 2001; Bak et al., 2006; Boulenger et al., 2008; Cotelli et al.,
2007; Kemmerer, Rudrauf, Manzel, & Tranel, 2012; Neininger &
Pulvermüller, 2003).18 As dissociations were documented between
action verbs and nouns with object reference, it may be that the
lexical category difference (noun/verb) played a role. However, con-
cordant deﬁcits were reported in conceptual tasks in which the use
of language stimuli was avoided (Bak et al., 2006; Kemmerer et al.,
2012); therefore, lexical factors cannot explain the full pattern of
dissociations between action and object concepts and related
words.
At a ﬁner experimental scale, a double dissociation pattern of
impairment between arm and leg word memory has recently been
documented while healthy subjects continuously performed com-
plex motor tasks. Performing the motor task with the hands led to
increased errors in memorizing lists of arm-words, whereas per-
forming it using the legs yielded higher error scores on leg-word
working memory tasks (Fig. 5, Shebani & Pulvermüller, 2013). As
the primary loci differentially activated by complex arm and leg
movement performance are in the motor system, this double dis-
sociation indicates shared processing resources in motor systems
between motor movements and semantically congruent action
word subcategories.4.5. Summary
In conclusion, recent work on language materials used to
speak about actions and objects makes it difﬁcult to maintain a
disembodied semantic perspective separating semantic from sen-
sorimotor processes. Not only would sensory and motor systems
become active in the processing of language, this activation also18 Recently, slowing of action verb processing was reported in an imagery (but not
in a frequency rating) task in patients with lesions in pre- and post-central sulcus
(Tomasino, Ceschia, Fabbro, & Skrap, 2012).reﬂects aspects of the meaning of utterances and is even effort-
less, fast, and the activated modality systems exert an inﬂuence,
sometimes performance-degrading inﬂuence, on category-speciﬁc
semantic and conceptual processes. These results falsify modular
theories of meaning, but are also difﬁcult to reconcile with cur-
rent minimally-embodied approaches such as the ones put for-
ward by Caramazza and his colleagues (Section 2). Especially,
statements about a ‘‘non-constitutive’’ ‘‘coloring’’ and ‘‘dressing’’
role in conceptual/semantic processing of action and perception
systems (cf. Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) seem insufﬁcient to pro-
vide the required accounts of fast activation spreading to, causal
effects of activity in, and deﬁcits after lesions of modality-speciﬁc
systems.
Therefore, it seems justiﬁed to reject the disembodied and min-
imally-embodied perspectives on semantic processing and to con-
clude that semantic systems of the mind and brain include action–
perception mechanisms as functionally important components.
APT, as outlined in Section 3, is consistent with and a-priori pre-
dicted many of the novel results summarized here, and, crucially,
mechanistically explains not only aspects of semantic ‘‘embodi-
ment’’ but also ‘‘disembodiment’’, e.g. movement of semantic pro-
100 F. Pulvermüller / Brain & Language 127 (2013) 86–103cesses away from sensorimotor systems, as illustrated in the con-
texts of memory, abstraction, combination and generalization. Fu-
ture work is needed to spell out the underlying neurobiological
mechanisms in more detail, for example taking advantage of fur-
ther neurocomputational work, and possibly using abstract words
and constructions as key examples. In this endeavor, mechanistic
neurobiological explanation and detailed accounts of semantic cir-
cuits appear most fruitful.
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